

## The US alliance network and the regional maritime order

### Hideshi Tokuchi

#### 1. The Indo-Pacific regional security environment

##### a. The two perspectives: Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific

Until recently, this region was usually called the Asia-Pacific. Today, it is being rapidly substituted by the new term Indo-Pacific.

This region is where the large continent meets the large ocean. In light of the fact that there live some of the world's major ground force powers such as India, North Korea and China in this region and that China has been advancing to the maritime space with a continental mindset, the Asia-Pacific perspective remains relevant.

Nonetheless, the Indo-Pacific perspective prevails today because of a number of reasons, including rise of India, maritime expansion of China, growing importance of Africa and increasing demand for connectivity of the region within itself and with the rest of the world through maritime space even including underwater cables. These facts make us focus much more on the Indian Ocean, which necessitates the rise of the term Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific is the term to express the confluence of the world's largest and third largest oceans. The fact that the South China Sea, the second largest sea in the world, connects the two oceans adds to the seascape nature of this region.

As the sea is one, the concept that hyphenates the two large oceans sounds natural. It is more natural to Japan, which defines itself as a maritime state ("National Security Strategy," 2013). Japan is an island country scarce in natural resources and dependent much on foreign trade and maritime connectivity with the world for its survival and prosperity. It is no wonder that Japan has a natural affinity to the Indo-Pacific perspective.

Indo-Pacific is the term often used by the Trump administration of the United States. The 2020 Democratic Party Platform did not use this term and instead used the old term Asia-Pacific (2020 Democratic Party Platform, 87-89). Although there remain unknowns about the trajectory of the new administration of the United States under President Joseph Biden, it is expected that the concept of the Indo-Pacific will continue as the guiding perspective of the new administration. As Kausikan (2021) points out about "U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific," drafted in 2017 and endorsed

by the former president, “the assumptions, interests, desired end-states, and actions in the 10-page document ... have an enduring and nonpartisan quality. It contains nothing that any experienced foreign policy practitioner such as Kurt Campbell should fundamentally disagree with. There is no need for the Biden administration to reinvent the wheel.”

While the US remains a hybrid nation, both continental and maritime, the US will continue to highlight the maritime perspective when facing this region. The American experts’ continuous emphasis on the freedom of navigation (Campbell and Sullivan, 2019, 102 and 110) and US Navy’s continuous conduct of freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea (7th Fleet Public Affairs, 2021) epitomize it.

#### b. Characteristics of the Indo-Pacific security environment

Most of nuclear weapon states, i.e., the US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea, are residents of the Indo-Pacific. As the United Kingdom and France have their territories in this region, they are not outsiders, either. European countries’ attention to this region has been growing as shown in the British formal request to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP), Germany’s establishment of its Indo-Pacific vision called “Policy guidelines for the Indo-Pacific region” and also the French vision called “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific.” This region is where national interests of major powers of the world are complicatedly involved. Today, this region is the main battlefield of the strategic competition between the US and China.

Although this region has been enjoying stability without long and large-scale armed conflicts for almost half a century since the end of the Vietnam War and the stability has brought a long-running prosperity to this region, the regional stability is just relative. This region is lack of an overarching comprehensive and inclusive multinational security framework. Instead, the regional peace and stability has been shored up by the US-centered alliance network. Originally, the US-centered security framework was just a bunch of US bilateral alliance relations with some of the regional countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. These American partners had only limited interactions in security terms with each other, and the US-led framework was called the hub-and-spokes system. Obviously, the US was the hub and the regional allies were at the tips of the

spokes. While the US has strengthened these bilateral ties, it also encouraged its allies to establish a habit to talk, coordinate and cooperate with each other. Such efforts generated a number of minilateral mechanisms such as US-Japan-Australia and US-Japan-South Korea. Today, the hub-and-spokes system is growing to a web-like alliance network with the allies more intertwined with each other.

The alliance network contributed to the establishment of a more inclusive mechanism for regional naval crisis management. In Beijing in April 2014, Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) adopted Code for Unplanned Encounter at Sea (CUES). Although WPNS is not an alliance (In fact, its members include China and Russia.), CUES could not have been achieved without strong partnership of the US and its regional alliance partners including Japan and Australia. Similarly, Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) hosted by the US Navy may be added to the list of contribution of the alliance network to the regional security cooperation. The RIMPAC biennial naval exercise began in the 1970s in the Cold War context among the navies of the western bloc countries in the region. After the end of the Cold War, it was transformed to include other partners (Actually, it began to include non-aligned countries such as Indonesia and sometimes included even China and Russia.) and to train non-traditional operations such as HA/DR and counter-piracy as well.

However, the US-led network is not inclusive as long as it remains alliance. For instance, India, though a Major Defense Partner of the US, remains autonomous. Singapore, a Major Security Cooperation Partner of the US based on the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, maintains the policy “to pursue an independent course and not to be allied to any major power,” and remains “a good friend and partner of China” though their world views are much different with each other (Koh, 2016). China, the biggest economy in Asia, is averse to the alliance network, insisting that the alliance is relic of the Cold War. Many actors in the region faces a dilemma, depending on the US for security and on China for economy. The large economic and trade system with China as a hub is placed on the small security system without China, and that is a source of instability of this region.

This region is full of traditional security agenda. As Kaplan (2015, 33) describes, “they [Asian states] are new to modern nationalism rather than sick and tired of it ... And so power politics reigns in Asia. It is not ideas

that Asians fight over, but space on the map.” The territorial dispute in the South China Sea is a typical example and Japan-China standoff in the East China Sea is another. Kaplan notes (2015, 33), “Their [Asian] stability on land for the first time in decades and centuries allows them to make territorial claims at sea.” The “stopping power of water” (Mearsheimer as quoted in Kaplan (2015, 7)) is not much dependable. The connecting power of water is apt to be misused by perpetrators and sometimes makes quick response and legitimate defense difficult. Preserving a balance of power will remain the basis of the regional maritime order, and the alliance network is the indispensable instrument to maintain a favorable balance, but the alliance network does not work best as a political problem-solving mechanism. Networking of the alliance network with other political and security mechanisms of this region is necessary to supplement its power.

This region, however, is part of global community without national borders. This region is not free from the dark side of the progress of globalization. Non-traditional security is also serious in this region. For example, sea level rise due to global warming encroaches upon the territories of a number of island states in the region. Large-scale natural disasters such as typhoons are human security concerns. Deterioration of marine environment and ecosystem damages indispensable sources of fish protein necessary for the regional inhabitants. Multilateral cooperation is the instrument to deal with these challenges. In fact, as Blair (2020, 2) points out, “the legacy of natural disasters in Asia has been generally positive. More often than not, they have engendered international cooperation,” exemplified by the December 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan. The multilateral operation to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia is an ongoing example of success story of international cooperation to address non-traditional security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

Today, however, the international community has not been successful in generating effective international cooperation to contain the Covid-19 pandemic, largely due to the US-China discord. The spread of the Covid-19 is even accelerating the great power rivalry.

It is also accelerating globalization in spite of the stagnating flow of goods and human beings. The international community is much more dependent on cyber space and more connected with greater flow of data,

information, ideas and views.

The pandemic tends to militate against military readiness and operations on the one hand, but it does not prevent some regional players from trying to alter the status quo by force and coercion on the other. China continues to be assertive at sea. For example, China continues to claim the Senkaku Islands, a group of Japanese islands in the East China Sea, by sending its government ships to the waters around the islands. As noted in an *NHK World-Japan* article, January 2, 2021, China's government vessels entered the contiguous zone adjacent to Japan's territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands for 333 days in 2020. It is a record far above the previous year's 282 days. Also, a total of 78 Chinese government vessels intruded into the Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands on 24 occasions in 2020. The number of ships and the frequency of entries were lower than in 2019, but the vessels stayed for a longer period in the Japanese waters. For instance, between October 11 and 13, 2020, Chinese vessels remained in the Japanese waters for a total of 57 hours and 39 minutes, breaking the previous record.

China's challenge to the maritime order is not limited to the intrusion of Chinese government ships to the Japanese waters. China's new Coast Guard Law took effect on February 1, 2021. Article 21 of the law allows the Coast Guard to take enforcement measures against foreign naval and other government ships in "the waters under the Chinese jurisdiction." The term "the waters under the Chinese jurisdiction" had been defined to include the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf in Article 74 of the draft released in November 2020, but the definition was deleted in the final text, and thus is ambiguous. China is accountable to the international community for the scope of the rule. Presumably, the Chinese side maintains the original definition found in the draft, and if so, the rule is against the principle of sovereign immunity as well as of freedom of navigation. Concerns of regional states on the Chinese implementation of the Coast Guard Law will continue.

Maritime order of the Indo-Pacific, particularly that of East Asia will continue to face traditional challenges as well as the non-traditional challenges unique to the region. Both competition and cooperation are necessary, but momentum to promote international cooperation is easily lost amid the great power competition.

### c. Different security environment of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia

China's maritime expansion poses a major challenge to the entire Indo-Pacific maritime order. As China's only exit to the maritime space is in East Asia, the East and South China Seas are focal points.

However, the security situations of these two waters are different from each other in the following two points.

First, the difference of the power balance. There are two US allies in Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea. These two nations host a large number of US troops on their soil to ensure robust US presence: 50,000 in Japan and 33,000 in South Korea. They cover most of the US military presence in the entire Indo-Pacific. While US forces in South Korea are mostly ground force to address the immediate threat of North Korea, a large majority of US forces in Japan are agile air force and marine corps and mobile naval force, including a career strike group. Japan's own maritime defense and coast guard capabilities are competitive. In contrast, Southeast Asia is close to power vacuum. While the US has two allies in there, the Philippines and Thailand, and Australia as another important ally in the vicinity of Southeast Asia, the South China Sea region is lack of permanent military presence of the US and the regional countries are relatively weak in their security capabilities. China is exploiting the situation for its maritime expansion. As noted by the Ministry of Defense of Japan (2020, 6), the history of the South China Sea shows that China occupied the eastern half of the Paracel Islands in the 1950s after the French withdrawal, that China occupied the entire Paracel islands in the mid-1970s shortly after the US withdrawal from South Vietnam, that China advanced to the Spratly Islands in the 1980s after the reduction of Soviet military presence in Vietnam, and that China occupied the Mischief Reef in the mid-1990s after the American withdrawal from the Philippines. Together with the Chinese large-scale land reclamation and infrastructure building in the Spratly Islands in recent years, the power balance in Southeast Asia is much more tilted toward the Chinese side.

Second, the difference of focal points of maritime security. Traditional security challenges are in both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. However, Southeast Asians are more concerned about non-traditional aspects of maritime security, including IUU fishing, drug trafficking, human trafficking,

piracy and armed robbery, than Northeast Asians. While ensuring the oneness of the sea by restoring balance of power to buttress the rule of law at sea has fundamental importance in the entire regional maritime order, those diverse security concerns in this region must be extensively addressed.

## 2. Prospect of the security policy of the new administration of the US

From a Japanese perspective, a key question for the peace and stability of the huge seascape of the Indo-Pacific is how to keep the US, the maritime power, engaged in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in East Asia, and to network the US alliance network in the region with other regional security frameworks and networks.

A set of new questions are added today. During the four years of the Trump administration, America's global reputation deteriorated and unpredictability of the US president confused not only adversaries but also allies and partners. No wonder allies became much less confident of the US security commitment. In January 2021, Biden was inaugurated as president. He said in his first foreign policy speech ("Remarks by President Biden," 2021), "America is back. America is back. Diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy." He reiterated what he had said in his inaugural address, "We will repair our alliances and engage with the world again, not to meet yesterday's challenges, but today's and tomorrow's." Is this a sign of America's resilience? Is his word in the inaugural address ("Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr," 2021) "We will be a strong and trusted partner for peace, progress, and security," truly trustworthy? Is the US up to this challenge?

Answers to these questions depend much on the health of the American democracy, as the concept of the rules-based liberal international order which the US tries to reestablish and strengthen is a Western idea, particularly based on the American political system. Credibility of the concept is largely dependent on the stability of and confidence in the American democracy. In other words, restoration of the American democracy is a source of healthy development of the rules-based liberal international order.

Then, what will the national security policy of the Biden administration as such be like? It has not been clearly articulated yet. It seems too early to tell at the start of the administration, though the new administration will be more predictable than the previous one. Judging from the statements

and articles of Biden himself, his staff and incoming officials of the administration, the national security policy seems roughly outlined by the following six points (Biden 2020; Biden-Harris Transition 2020; Campbell and Sullivan 2019; Hicks et al. 2020; Hicks 2020; Blinken 2021; “Remarks by President Biden,” 2021; “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” 2021).

First, establishing a position of strength for the US to be able to deal with great power competition.

Second, reinvesting in US treaty alliances and deepening partnerships with other nations that share values and goals.

Third, getting touch on China and outcompeting China while cooperating with China on issues where both interests converge.

Fourth, placing the Indo-Pacific as the region of the greatest attention.

Fifth, expecting US allies to take primary responsibility for their own defense.

And finally, maintaining technological superiority over geopolitical competitors and operational readiness, and reviewing US global force posture so that it is consistent with national security and diplomatic priorities.

There are four immediate questions here.

First, President Biden’s foreign policy is called “a foreign policy for the middle class (Biden 2020; “Remarks by President Biden,” 2021; “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan,” 2021). It has to focus on the US domestic economy. The benchmark will be whether and how each policy option contributes to the well-being of the American middle-class people. US opinion polls (Pew Research Center 2019, 80; Chicago Council 2020, 10) show that the Americans affirm importance of allies and they say that the US should take the interests of its allies into account even if it means making compromises or if it means that the US will sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not its first choice, but the question remains whether the US middle-class people will be convinced that the policy to strengthen alliances and partnerships is consistent with their interests.

Second, competing while cooperating with China is easier said than done. As already noted, even the Covid-19 outbreak has accelerated US-China discord and has not enhanced an atmosphere for international cooperation. While there are lots of requirements for security cooperation



between the US and China including in climate security and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, all of which are relevant to maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region, balancing the need for competition with that for cooperation will be a challenging task. In light of today's confrontational atmosphere, effort for cooperation with China might be viewed as soft on China both in the US politics and by the US allies.

Third, the future of the Indo-Pacific construct remains uncertain. Before inauguration, Biden used the expression "a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific" in his conversation with Australia's Prime Minister Scott Morrison ("Readout of the President-elect's Foreign Leader Calls" November 11, 2020) and with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi ("Readout of the President-elect's Foreign Leader Calls" November 17, 2020) and a similar expression in his conversation with Japan's Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and with South Korea's President Moon Jae-in (Both in "Readout of the President-elect's Foreign Leader Calls" November 11, 2020), instead of "a free and open Indo-Pacific." More recently, he used "a free and open Indo-Pacific" in his conversation with Suga ("Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan" 2021) and with China's President Xi Jinping ("Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Xi Jinping of China" 2021). It would be risky to read the subtle change of the adjectives too much. Biden might have been just trying to avoid the language used by his predecessor, or as Strangio (2020) points out, it indicates a shift to a more pragmatic register, diluting its ideological framing. If so, it might gain broader support particularly in Southeast Asia as he suggests, but the Indo-Pacific strategy of the Biden administration has not been articulated yet. Here as well, balancing competition and cooperation with China will be a challenging task, and the degree of alignment with US allies and partners on the implementation of the strategy will depend on the balance, as the free and open Indo-Pacific concept entails both competitive and cooperative aspects in relation with China as mentioned later.

Finally, reviewing global force posture is critically important to establish a favorable balance of power in East Asian sea. Though the US government is not specific about the impact of the newly started review work on the Indo-Pacific region, there are some hints in the past articles of a number of key officials of the new administration. Hicks et al. (2020) argues

that the US should focus on countering Chinese and Russian high-end military capabilities and seek to calibrate its force presence in Asia to provide credible deterrence and assurance and to support combined capabilities improvements while improving force resiliency, exercising active US leadership as China's weaker neighbors in the region are both geographically far from each other and do not always share similar interests. Campbell and Doshi (2021) argues that the US needs to help states in the Indo-Pacific develop their own asymmetric capabilities to deter Chinese behavior and that although the US should maintain its forward presence, it also needs to work with other states to disperse US forces across Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. Enhancement of its force presence and support to regional allies and partner will be promoted to establish a favorable balance of power.

### 3. Japan's approach for building maritime order in Southeast Asia

Japan's immediate maritime security concern is on the East China Sea as Japan has been constantly facing the Chinese threat to Japan's sovereignty on the Senkaku Islands. However, Japan's security interests are not limited to the East China Sea. As the sea is one and also as Japan depends much on maritime trade, Japan pays great attention to the maritime space beyond the East China Sea, particularly to the South China Sea. Statistics tells that one third of the world commerce go through the South China Sea and that a quarter of the crude oil and a half of the natural gas that go through the South China Sea is headed for Japan (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2016). Also, Erickson (2016) points out that serious Chinese sources call China's use of its maritime militia to attain effective control over the Scarborough Shoal and its surrounding waters "Scarborough Shoal Model" and that according to a Chinese researcher, this model has been explored by China vis-à-vis the Senkaku Islands dispute. Thus, the maritime order of the South China Sea and that of the East China Sea are not different issues from the Japanese perspective. Both are in Japan's own security interests.

As the Japan-US Alliance will remain the pillar of Japan's national security policy and it is the alliance of the two main maritime states in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan-US alliance cooperation will continue to be the main consideration in Japan's maritime security policy, including for the South China Sea and Southeast Asia.

In recent years, the two allies have been working together to maintain

a rules-based international order under the banner of “a free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). Japan’s FOIP vision is a broad concept to mainly include economy, trade and infrastructure building, but it has an element of international security as indicated in one of the pillars of the vision “commitment for peace and stability.” This vision has two aspects: competition and cooperation with China, probably even in the area of international maritime security, though not articulated yet.

Japan-US alliance coordination of the respective FOIP visions will be prioritized in the coming years as the new administration started in the US. In due course, it will become clearer what Biden had in mind when he referred to “a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific” instead of “a free and open Indo-Pacific.” In fact, in the first Japan-US Summit Telephone Talk of January 28, 2021 between President Biden and Prime Minister Suga, the two leaders shared the view on the importance of strengthening the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region and also affirmed that they would work side-by-side to address regional challenges and to realize a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2021).

Southeast Asia is a focal point of the FOIP vision. Suga chose Southeast Asia as the destination of his first official trip overseas as prime minister in October 2020. He visited Vietnam, the year’s chair country of ASEAN, and Indonesia, the biggest economy and most populous nation in ASEAN. In his speech at the Vietnam-Japan University, Hanoi (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2020), Suga emphasized the commonalities between ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and FOIP, saying, “What brought about the wide range of cooperation between ASEAN and Japan ...? I believe the key is that ASEAN and Japan fully share fundamental principles such as the rule of law, openness, freedom, transparency and inclusiveness. ... The ASEAN Outlook powerfully sets for the rule of law, openness, freedom, transparency and inclusiveness as the ASEAN’s principles for behavior. The fact that it shares many fundamental commonalities with the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Japan is advocating for is tremendously encouraging for me. I strongly support AOIP. I firmly believe that we can create a peaceful and prosperous future along with ASEAN with these fundamental values in common.” Japan’s commitment to the cooperation with ASEAN to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific has been articulated here.

Japan is aware that Southeast Asian nations are more unwilling than

Japan to be placed in a position in which they have to take side in the US-China rivalry. Emphasizing the inclusive aspect and the economic aspect of the FOIP vision, Japan will try to widen the room for collaboration with ASEAN. Security aspect of the vision, particularly its military aspect, is diluted as shown in the fact that the main project for “commitment for peace and stability” is capacity building of Southeast Asian maritime law enforcement organizations.

However, there is no denying that the FOIP vision works also as a guiding concept for defense cooperation, as stated in the National Defense Program Guidelines (The Government of Japan 2018). Therefore, Japan and the US, unilaterally and in concert, will try to work on Southeast Asian countries to help build a rules-based maritime order in the region, capitalizing on the FOIP vision.

Then, will the Japan-US Alliance remain relevant to the regional maritime order in Southeast Asia? The answer will depend on the following four points:

First, will Japan and the US be able to soon raise their presence in the South China Sea to help strike a favorable balance of power? Increasing maritime exercises and port calls will be an idea. Southeast Asian partners' cooperation and assistance will be indispensable to realize this idea, and therefore winning their support will be increasingly important. Incidentally, on October 19-20, 2020, Japan, the US and Australia conducted a naval exercise in the South China Sea. As the Japan-US and US-Australia Alliances are integral parts of the US regional alliance network, the trilateral collaboration of these three maritime democracies is also expected.

Second, will Japan and the US be able to cooperate more extensively with Southeast Asian countries to help them build maritime security capabilities, including maritime domain awareness (MDA)? From a long-term perspective, this is essentially necessary in order to establish a favorable balance of power in the region, because most of the regional militaries are weak and defense capability enhancement demands long time and huge cost.

Third, will Japan and the US be able to successfully provide assistance to Southeast Asian countries in accordance with their immediate necessities, particularly in non-traditional security such as HA/DR? In this assistance, an inclusive and cooperative aspect of international security should be emphasized so that the possibility of cooperation even with China is explored.

As the above-mentioned two points represent the FOIP vision's competitive aspect, this third point is important in striking a right balance of competition and cooperation with China.

Fourth, will Japan and the US be able to encourage their Southeast Asian partners to make closer cooperation of the naval and coast guard forces so that the Southeast Asian countries may effectively address China's maritime gray zone warfare in the South China Sea? For this purpose, Japan and the US must be the role model for the Southeast Asians. Their own effort to muster the naval and coast guard expertise to deal with China's gray zone warfare in the East China Sea would be critically important and useful for the Southeast Asian countries. In other words, the Japan-US Alliance as such must be prepared to counter China's gray zone warfare. Today, the immediate maritime threat to the alliance is not an all-out aggression of an armed attack imagined in the Cold War context. Addressing gray zone maritime warfare is the urgent necessity for all those concerned about maritime security in East Asia. China's violation of Japan's national sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands issue is the typical gray zone warfare against Japan. If the Japan-US Alliance can effectively tackle this difficult problem, it will continue to be relevant to the regional maritime order as a whole. The alliance must be ready for this challenge. A new definition of the Japan-US Alliance to adapt itself to the age of the US-China rivalry is awaited.

Reference list:

Biden, Joseph, March/April 2020, "Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 64-76.

Biden-Harris Transition, December 28, 2020, "National Security Agency Review Teams Briefing Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by President-elect Joe Biden in Wilmington, Delaware," <https://www.dsjournal.com/2020/12/28/national-security-agency-review-teams-briefing-remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery-by-president-elect-joe-biden-in-wilmington-delaware/>.

Blair, Dennis, 2020, "Uncharted Territory: Asian Security after Covid-19,"

*The New Normal in Asia*, <https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/new-normal-blair-061320.pdf>.

Blinken, Anthony, “Statement for the Record before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” January 19, 2021, [https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/011921\\_Blinken\\_Testimony.pdf](https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/011921_Blinken_Testimony.pdf).

Campbell, Kurt and Doshi, Rush, January 12, 2021, “How America Can Shore Up Asian Order: A Strategy for Restoring Balance and Legitimacy,” *Foreign Affairs*, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-01-12/how-america-can-shore-asian-order>.

Campbell, Kurt and Sullivan, Jake, 2019, “Competition Without Catastrophe: How America Can Both Challenge and Coexist With China,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 98, no. 5, 96-110.

Chicago Council on Global Affairs, July 2020, “Divided We Stand: 2020 Chicago Council Survey.”

Erickson, Andrew, September 21m 2016, “The South China Sea’s Third Force: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia,” 4-5, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/as/as28/20160921/105309/hhr-114-as28-wstate-ericksonphda-20160921.pdf>.

The Government of Japan, December 18, 2018, *National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond (Provisional Translation)*, [https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218\\_e.pdf](https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf).

The Government of Japan, December 17, 2013, *National Security Strategy (Provisional Translation)*, <https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryoku/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>.

Hicks, Kathleen, Joseph Federici, Seamus Daniels, et al., January 2020, “Getting to Less? The Innovation Superiority Strategy,” *CSIS Briefs*.

Hicks Kathleen, March/April 2020, “Getting to Less: Truth About Defense Spending,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 56-62.

“Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,” January 20, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/01/20/inaugural-address-by-president-joseph-r-biden-jr/>.

Kaplan, Robert, 2015, *Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific*. New York: Random House.

Kausikan, Bilahari, “The Indo-Pacific after Donald Trump,” *NIKKEI Asia*, January 17, 2021, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/The-Indo-Pacific-after-Donald-Trump>.

Koh, Tommy, “China's perception of Singapore: 4 areas of misunderstanding,” *Straits Times*, October 21, 2016, <https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/chinas-perception-of-singapore-4-areas-of-misunderstanding>.

Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2020, Minami-shinakai jousei (chuugoku-niyoru chikei-umetate, kankeikoku-no doukou) [Situations of the South China Sea: land reclamation by China and movements of interested countries]. [https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch\\_d-act\\_b.pdf](https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/surround/pdf/ch_d-act_b.pdf).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 19, 2020, “Speech by Prime Minister Suga at the Vietnam-Japan University: Building together the future of Indo-Pacific,” [https://www.mofa.go.jp/s\\_sa/sea1/vn/page3e\\_001070.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sea1/vn/page3e_001070.html).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 28, 2021, “Japan-U.S. Summit Telephone Talk,” [https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page1e\\_000305.html](https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page1e_000305.html).

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 19, 2016, “Suuji-ga kataru minami-shinakai: arasoi maneku yutakasa [The South China Sea by numbers: Conflict-inducing affluence],” <https://vdata.nikkei.com/datadiscovery/17southcs/>.

7th Fleet Public Affairs, February 5, 2021, “7th Fleet Destroyer conducts Freedom of Navigation Operation in South China Sea,” <https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/2494240/7th-fleet-destroyer-conducts-freedom-of-navigation-operation-in-south-china-sea/>.

Pew Research Center, December 2019, “In a Politically Polarized Era, Sharp Divides in Both Partisan Coalitions: Partisanship remains biggest factor in public’s political values.”

“Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan,” February 4, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2021/02/04/press-briefing-by-press-secretary-jen-psaki-and-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-february-4-2021/>.

“Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Xi Jinping of China,” February 10, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/02/10/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-president-xi-jinping-of-china/>.

“Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga of Japan,” January 27, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/27/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-prime-minister-yoshihide-suga-of-japan/>.

“Readout of the President-elect’s Foreign Leader Calls,” November 11, 2020, <https://buildbackbetter.gov/press-releases/readout-of-the-president-elects-foreign-leader-calls/>.

“Readout of the President-elect’s Foreign Leader Calls,” November 17, 2020, <https://buildbackbetter.gov/press-releases/readout-of-the-president-elects-foreign-leader-calls-2/>.

“Record activity by Chinese ships around Senkakus,” *NHK World-Japan*, January 2, 2021, [https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20210102\\_17/](https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20210102_17/).



“Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” February 4, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/>.

Strangio, Sebastian, November 20, 2020, “Is Biden Preparing to Tweak the Indo-Pacific Strategy?” *Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/11/is-biden-preparing-to-tweak-the-indo-pacific-strategy/>.

*2020 Democratic Party Platform*, July 2020.